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NIGERIAN DISCOUNT HOUSES: PERFORMANCE,
PROBLEMS AND RE-POSITIONING
By
Felix U. Ezeudujit J. Abayomi Babalola & M. Aderemi Adegbite 1
ABSTRACT
The paper sets out to assess the performance of discount houses in Nigeria
and in particular to identify their achievements and problems with the aim
of articulating measures to re-position the institutions for improved performance.
As a background, the paper reviews the concept of discount houses, the origin
of discount house system, their global spread and alternative systems as well
as their variations over the years within and among economies. The British
model was applied as the basis of the comparative analysis in the paper. This
review offers good insight into the rationale and philosophy of adopting
the discount house system in Nigeria. Thus, Nigeria's discount house system,
which was patterned after the existing discount houses in other economies,
commenced operations in 1993 but started in 1995 to experience serious
liquidity and viability problems. These problems which followed a short
boom between 1993 and 1994, were traced to a number of factors. First, the
accelerated deregulation of the money market since 1995 removed direct
control and resulting distortions on which the discount houses thrived.
Second, the pursuit of tight monetary policy by the Monetary Authorities
moderated liquidity whose management in the past provided substantial
profit to the discount houses. Third, the improved distress resolution
measures restored confidence to the banks which attracted some of the business
hitherto done by the discount houses. Finally, the enhanced efficiency and
stability in the foreign exchange market reduced the need to keep overnight
funds with the discount houses in order to make purchases at the hitherto
volatile foreign exchange market. The paper examines two options for resolving
the observed problems. While the first option seeks a protected discount house
system in which banks would be excluded, the second explores a situation in
which discount houses and banks would participate jointly in both discount
house and banking business. Finally, the paper considers the second option as
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more appropriate in Nigeria's deregulated financial setting in which distortions,
inefficiencies, and excessive liquidity has been reduced, thereby making it
difficult for the existing discount houses to survive under the resulting
contraction in pure discount house business which focuses attention on
managing liquidity in the money market.

I.

INTRODUCTION
Every economy recognises the need for institutional support to foster
the growth of an active money market, deepen money market transactions,
underwrite government short-term securities and promote active trading in
private sector financial instruments. However, there is no consensus on
institutions which should perform these functions. This explains why
different countries use different institutions for this purpose. For example,
in the Philippines and the United States of America, a consortium of financial
institutions are relied upon more or less to undertake these activities while in
Zimbabwe, Malaysia, India and recently Ghana, discount houses are used
largely to perform the above-named money market functions. Britain, which
pioneered the discount house system, has de-emphasised reliance on discount
houses. Other countries use variants of these systems with or without the
same nomenclature.
Before discount houses were established in Nigeria, commercial
and merchant banks, along with the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), had
started to perform some money market functions which discount houses
perform in those countries where they are in existence. When Nigeria wanted
to strengthen the performance of its money market activities, the choice was
between the continued use and improvement of services rendered by banks
in this direction and the establishment of discount houses to take over the
functions.
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In 1991, the decision to establish discount houses in Nigeria was taken
while the modalities for its establishment were completed in 1993 when the
new intermediary came on stream. As the discount houses were being established,
there were divergent views on the role which the new institutions would play
vis-a-vis the existing banks which had been holding the fort. The differing views
hc/.5 led to subseqdent reviews of the operating guidelines for discount houses.
Despite these changes, there have been persistent calls for further reviews. These
calls, led by discount houses themselves, seek to improve their relative position
to banks in performing the relevant money market functions, especially at
this time when the fortunes of the discount houses are on the decline. The
ensuing debate is complicated by the fact that the banks seek to continue
with the money market activities which the discount houses want to restrict
to themselves. These developments call for a critical review and streamlining
of the activities of discount houses in relation to other money market operators.
This paper has two-fold objective, namely, to undertake a critical
assessment of the progress and problems of discount houses in Nigeria so
far and to identify a package of measures which would enhance the
contribution of the discount houses to the development of the money market
and the economy without provoking another round of protest from banks.
To achieve the twin-objective of the paper, the rest of the paper is
organised in four sections. Section 11 explains conceptual issues relating
to discount house system and its international perspective while section III
examines the operations and the appraisal of discount houses in Nigeria.
Section IV draws from the operating environment and international experiences
in proposing a package of measures to enhance the contribution of discount
houses to money market development before Section V which brings the paper
to an end by a swnmary and concluding remarks.

II.

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN DISCOUNT HOUSE
OPERATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES
To appreciate the need or otherwise for operating discount houses,
it would be instructive to examine the meaning and rationale for such a system.
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11.1

Meaning and Rationale
Discount houses are usually non-bank financial institutions which
specialize in intermediating funds between the Central Bank on one hand
and the banking institutions on the other with the primary purpose of
assisting the monetary authorities in monetary management. Indeed, discount
houses are usually associated with liquidity management in the money market.
According to Revell (l 973), one important aspect of the functions of discount
houses has always been the service provided to banks by enabling them to
adjust their liquidity as conveniently as possible. Most observers of the
discount house system hold similar view. ·For example, Bank Negara Malaysia
(1994) considered the traditional functions of discount houses to be keepers
of liquidity. In the same vein, a Review of the Banks· and monetary system
in the United Kingdom, edited by Wardsworth (1971), showed that discount
houses rendered a double service by first taking loans from the banks repayable
at call, and secondly providing a ready market for short-term government
securities. Thus, as money market institutions, discount houses assist in
promoting orderly development of the market by smoothening out the surpluses
and short falls in the supply of and demand for liquid funds 'i n the system.
This is achieved usually through their participation in the open market
operations of the Central Bank. Through the sale and purchase of short-term
securities, the discount houses influence bank reserves in the desired direction
and by interacting with the monetary authorities on daily basis, the houses
assist in the goal of creating an optimal liquidity profile for the system.
In the process of assisting the Monetary Authority in liquidity
management, discount houses are known to have provided a number of
specific services to the money market. These include(a)
intermediating funds between the Central Bank and the banks
thereby limiting direct access of these banking institutions to the
Central Banks;
(b)
promoting growth and efficiency of the money market by bringing
orderliness in money market transactions;
(c)
providing discount and rediscount facilities to banks so as to relieve
the Central Bank of the burden of carrying out such tasks;
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(d)

facilitating the issue and sale of short-term government securities
in several ways, including sometimes by serving as underwriters;
(e)
accepting short-term deposits, especially overnight deposits from
banks, thus allowing the Central Bank to concentrate on other tasks; and
(f)
providing short-term accommodation to banks which otherwise would
have been provided by the Central Bank.
The foregoing functions have varied over time and places as each
economy searches for ways and means of making its money market more
effective. To appreciate the evolving functions and uses of the discount
house system, it would be instructive to draw from international perspectives
·i.-.
and experiences.
International Experiences In Discount House Operations
While the general focus of discount houses remains that of enhancing
the money market by intermediating funds between an economy's Central
Bank and other financial institutions especially the banks, their operational
characteristics have shown significant differences among those nations
which have utilised their services. Even in the same nation, changes in
operational outlook over the years are also observed. These changing features
can be illustrated from the experiences of discount houses in Britain. Although
the experiences of other countries could be explored, the case of Britain wil1
be given prominence because of its uniqueness.
2.2

2.2.1

British Model of Discount House Operations
The origin of discount houses is often traced to Britain where they have
over the years served as a link between banks and the Bank of England.
They started largely through private sector initiatives to provide a medium
,for the deployment of short-term funds of banks and the channel for smooth
interchange of banks' funds as well as access to the Bank of England as a
From the 19th century to early 20th century,
'tender of the last resort.
commercial bills constituted the main trading instrument for the British
discount houses in the money market. However, subsequently treasury
bills replaeed commercial bills as the major trading instT-Uments, though
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with fluctuating fortunes over the years. In effect, the major contribution
of Britain to the global economy in the area of money market management
is the "exportation" of the discount house system to several countries to
assist their central banks in liquidity management. The experiences of
Britain over the years have indicated that discount houses have tended to
survive not on the main activity of discounting bills but through other
innovative services outside their main functions. In the early years in
Britain discounting of trade bills dominated their activjties while many also
relied on secondary market trading in treasury bills which became important
as means of government financing. During the 1930s discount houses in
Britain also acted as jobbers in the short end of gilt-edged market. However,
in the last few years bill financing has once again become important in
both internal and international trade, and discount houses have resumed some
of their old functions. They have also begun to operate on the parallel money
market in several ways including dealings in both dollar and sterling
negotiable certificates of deposits and in local authority negotiable bonds.
Discount houses have also established subsidiaries which have acted as
brokers in money market and engaged in foreign exchange transactions.
The British model thus implied that over the years, discount houses
have transformed into a veritable institutions in the money market and have
expanded in scope to include activities in both the capital and foreign exchange
market essentially through subsidiaries. Now their function in the trading
of gilts remained substantially important in spite of the transformation the
institutions have undergone over the years. The Bank of England reliance
on them for the conduct of monetary policy actions might have somewhat
diminished, but their importance in the overall institutional management in
the British financial system remained important. The houses have also
engaged in investment banking functions in addition to their traditional roles
in an effort to remain relevant in the financial system.
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2.2.2
(1)

Other Countries Experiences
Malaysia
The traditional role of discount houses in Malaysia has been that
of "keepers of liquidity". Thus, they specialized originally in short-term
money market operations by mobilising funds from other financial
intermediaries and large enterprises in the form of overnight money, money
at call and short-term deposits. However, following the financial reforms
adopted in that country from 1989 in order to provide a level playing field
for financial institutions, the role of discount houses was transformed into
bona fide securities dealers. Consequently, the guidelines for discount houses
were reviewed to enable them to compete with other financial institutions.
Between 1989 and 1991, several changes were made in the existing
laws and guidelines in search of level playing field for discount houses with
other financial institutions. These changes could be summarized as follows:
a)
The eligibility liability base for computing liquidity ratio was harmonized
for banks and discount houses.
Discount houses along with 11 other financial institutions were
(b)
appointed principal dealers to underwrite primary issues of
government securities.
(c)
The operations of discount houses were brought under the country's
Bank Act.
Discount houses were allowed to invest in authorised assets with
(d)
maturity periods of up to 10 years as against shorter periods previous! y.
(e)
Discount houses were permitted to invest, trade, undenvrite and manage
issues of eligible private debt securities as may be approved by the
Malaysian Central Bank.
What makes discount houses operation unique in Malaysia is the
involvement of the houses in both money and foreign exchange market apart
from being relevant in discount of domestic trade bills.
Singapore
Discount houses in Singapore were introduced to foster growth of
a more active money market and to play the role of stimulating competition
(ii)
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among participants in the market. ln this regard, the discount houses
traditionally have provided the link between the country's Monetary
Authority on one hand and the banks together with other financial institutions
on the other hand.
Instruments traditionally traded include treasury bills, Singapore
dollar negotiable certificates of deposit, commercial bills of exchange and
short-term government securities. The discount houses are required to
underwrite weekly treasury bills issues and participate actively in secondary
market for government securities. On the other hand, discount houses are
to refrain from competing with commercial banks in attracting deposits
from individuals and corporations. Although banks have not been forbidden
to discount treasury bills among themselves, they have preferred to do so
with discount houses. However, by the end of the 1980s discount houses
in Singapore had become ineffective in performing the these functions.
Subsequently, other securities dealers were encouraged to play the role of
market makers in government securities. The discount houses in Singapore
are encouraged to be involved in certain areas of business like investment
banking activities traditionally reserved for banks.

(iii)

Zimbabwe
The money market in Zimbabwe has been patterned after that
of Britai·n. This linkage implied the establishment of similar institutions,
including discount houses which numbered three by 1990. ln Zimbabwe,
money at call from the banking system has formed the basis for discount
house operations. Such fund is invested by the discount houses in a range of
risk-free securities, mainly short-term negotiable instruments with fixed
interest rates. Banks in Zimbabwe prefer to leave money at call with discount
houses, not only because it is risk-free but also because such a fund is easily
recoverable on demand.
The major instruments traded include treasury bills, bankers
acceptances, negotiable certificates of deposit, government stocks and corporate
debentures. Thus, discount houses make markets in the securities by quoting
buying and selling prices to all participants. To consolidate the stability of
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the market, the discount houses ensure that they maintain adequate portfolio
holdings. The relative success of discount houses in Zimbabwe has been
attributed to the confidence banks have in them, the high standard of their
infrastructure such as functional telecommunication and a regular power
supply as well as the optimal size in the number of the houses. Disco~nt
houses in Zimbabwe are moving towards investment banking functions
apart from being dominant in the trading of short-dated government securities.
(iv)

Ghana
Prior to the setting up of discount houses in Ghana, money market
activities followed the traditional banking pattern. When discount houses
were introduced in Ghana, they were meant to complement and not compete
with the banks. Consequently, the Bank of Ghana conducts open market
operations (OMO) through the discount houses, commercial banks, merchant
and development banks, non-bank financial institutions, corporate bodies
and individuals. However, since non-bank institutions and individuals have
no account with the Central Bank, they are required to submit their bids through
their banks. The discount houses and banks have become the major players
in the primary market while the discount houses, as a group, are the major
players in the secondary market. The discount houses in Ghana remained
active in the primary and secondary market for government treasury bills
while seeking other functions in the money market to stay afloat.
2.3

Nigerian Experience in Discount House Operations
The concept of discount houses in Nigeria is similar to that in those
countries reviewed earlier. Discount houses in Nigeria were modelled along
the British experience. However, their operators have deferred in some
respects. Indeed, before the discount houses were established in Nigeria,
the operations of such institutions in Zimbabwe, Malaysia and <;ihana were
closely observed along with money market practices in countries such as
the Philippines and the United States of America where discount houses do
not exist as separate institutions. These experiences influenced the basis for
the form of discount houses introduced in Nigeria. Consequently, a discount
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house in Nigeria is defined operationally as any person who transacts
discount house business which in the main consists of trading in/and holding
of treasury bills, commercial bills and other securities and whose operations
are in the opinion of the CBN, those of a discount house. Thus, the
discount houses facilitate financial intermediation through transactions in
those securities.
In the next section, the operations of discount houses in Nigeria
would be reviewed and appraised. The discount houses in Nigeria because
of the problems they have encountered have tended to shift grounds like
the experiences in Britain. They now engaged in other functions which
are traditionally hitherto reserved for banks, while creating market for
investment in government securities. They are also active in the secondary
market for treasury bills.

3.0

THE REVIEW AND APPRAISAL OF DISCOUNT HOUSES IN
NIGERIA
Drawing from the needs of the Nigerian money market and the
experiences of other countries, efforts were made between December 1991
and September 1992 to determine the "mission" and limits of discount
houses in Nigeria. From the guidelines issued on 7th September,. 1992,
discount houses in Nigeria were expected to:
(a)
promote rapid growth and efficiency of the money market in Nigeria;
(b)
act as intermediary between the Central Bank of Nigeria and the licensed
banks;
(c)
facilitate the issue and sale of short-term government securities by tender;
provide discount/rediscount facilities for treasury bills and other
(d)
eligible financial instruments as required by banks;·
(e)
accept short-term deposits from banks; and
(f)
perform other functions which may be prescribed by the CBN from
time to time.
These goals formed the basis for the initial guidelines with which
the discount houses commenced operations.
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3.1

Operating Guidelines for Discount Houses in Nigeria
Section 28 of Central Bank of Nigeria Decree, No. 21 and Banks and
Other Financial Institutions (BOFI) Decree, No. 25 of 1991 empowered the
CBN to issue appropriate guidelines for the operations of discount houses
in Nigeria. Consequently, the CBN issued the guidelines with which the
discount houses commenced operations. These guidelines, which were
issued on 7th September 1992, can be summarised as follows:
(a)

Preamble
The guidelines, which replaced an earlier one issued in December
1991, traces its legal backing to both the CBN and BOFI Decrees and
provides an operational definition of a discount house as stated earlier.
Furthermore, the guiddines indicate that only local banks, financial
institutions and insurance companies with or without the participation
of international finance institutions acceptable to the CBN can subscribe to
the shares of a discount house business while the maximum permissible
equity holding for a single investor in a discount house shall be 40 per cent.
Also, the introductory part of the guidelines gives the objectives and
principal duties of discount houses as indicated earlier.
(b)

Procedure for Application for Discount House Business:
This section of the guidelines requires the following procedure to
be fallowed:
(i) submission of the application to the Governor of the CBN
(ii) attachment of all relevant documents;
(iii) incorporation/registration of name with the Corporate Affairs
Commission (CAC) before approval-in-principle is obtained
from the CBN;
(iv) satisfying the CBN with the quality of management; earning
prospects and objects of the discount house;

(v) showing evidence of payment of the relevant deposits and
payments;
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(vi) getting approval-in-principle from the CBN; and
(vii) getting a licence from the CBN after fulfilling all relevant conditions.

(c)

Management Requirements
This provision gives the minimum qualification and experiences
which are mandatory for officers who may occupy the key/top management
positions in a discount house. The managing director and departmental
heads are expected to be university degree holders or to have professional
qualifications that are acceptable to the CBN. The managing director is
expected to have fifteen years post qualification experience while the
departmental heads should possess ten years post qualification experience.
(d)

Conditions Precedent to the Commencement of Operations
After fulfilling the foregoing preliminary conditions, the promoters
of a discount house are expected to comply with the remaining conditions
before the house can commence business:
(i) submission of a number of documents which include shareholders'
register; a copy of share certificate issued to each share holder;
two certified copies of Form CO2 on the return of allotees filed
with Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC); two copies of
form C07 on tl"\e particulars of directors; two certified true copies
of the memorandum and articles of association; the opening
statement of affairs audited by a firm of accountants practising
in Nigeria; two copies of the incorporation certificates; and
two copies of letters of offer and acceptance of employment
indicating that the management team, approved by the CBN,
has been installed;
(ii) providing the CBN with the location and address of the Head
Office of the discount house;
(iii) receiving a written authorisation by the CBN to commence
business;
(iv) displaying the operational licence at a conspicuous position at
the Head Office; and
(v) providing the CBN with the date for commencement of business.
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(e)

Sources of Funds:
According to this section, the authorised sources of funds for a
licensed discount house include equity (i.e. paid up capital and reserves); call
money and short-term borrowing of not more than twelve months maturity;
overnight advance from the CBN against acceptable collateral provided it
is not more than 20 per cent of the total assets of the discount house; and
utilisation of the re discount facilities for its holdings of treasury bills, treasury
certificates or securities issued by the CBN.
(f)

Structure of Assets
The short-term nature of the liabilities of a discount house makes
it necessary for its assets to be substantially liquid. Consequently, this section
of the guidelines stipulates the asset composition of discount houses to
consist of treasury bills; treasury certificates, negotiable certificates of deposits
(NCDs); bankers' acceptances; eligible commercial papers; eligible development
stocks, eligible state bonds; promissory notes issued by state governments;
and any other securities that may be approved by the CBN.
(g)

Prudential Requirements
To guide the discount houses in self-regulation, the guidelines stipulate
a number of safety measures. These include:
(i) transferring to the reserve fund a minimum of 15 per cent of
profit after tax until the reserve fund equals the authorised
capital and a minimum of 10 per cent subsequently.
(ii) maintaining capital funds to risk asset ratio as may be prescribed
by the CBN;
(iii) maintaining a ratio of not more than 50: 1 between its total
borrowing and capital plus reserves without the prior approval
of the CBN;
(iv) not granting to any bank, loan or credit facility of more than
75 per cent of its shareholders' funds unimpaired by losses
without the prior approval of the CBN;
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(v)

maintaining not less than 70 per cent of its assets in treasury
bills with maturity not exceeding 90 days; and
(vi) maintaining proper book of accounts as specified by the CBN.
(h)

Requirements For Returns, Accounts, Adverts and Structural
Changes
To have continuous grip on the discount houses, some directives
are issued with respect to the procedure and timing for a number of returns
which include returns on settlement each day, each week and each month as
well as the responsibilities of the discount houses with respect to audited
accounts, interest rates, adverts, changes in management and board of
directors, and obtaining relevant approvals for different activities.

(i)

Prohibited Activities
To allow the discount house to concentrate on its approved business,
the guidelines provide a list of prohibited activities. These include granting
loan facilities to directors or the general public; dealing in gold or foreign
exchange; payment of dividend on its shares before its preliminary expenses
and non- recapitalised expenses have been completely written off, accepting
any money or deposit or loan which is payable by cheque, draft, order or
any other instrument drawn by the depositor on the discount house; and
engaging in any business other than those for which it was licensed.

(j)

Conditions for Revocation of Licence
To serve as a deterrent to reckless operation of discount house
business, there is a provision in the guidelines to revoke the licence for serious
breach of the guidelines. Some of the offences which may attract revocation
of licence include submission of false information during and after the
processing of application for licence; engaging in activities outside the scope
of the licence and persistent failure to comply with any guidelines of the
CBN or provisions of the BOFI Decree, 1991, as amended. Other conditions
for revocation are engaging in activities prejudicial to the economy; having
insufficient assets to meet its liabilities; and any other acts which, in the opinion
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of the CBN, constitute a violation of any of the provisions of the guidelines
and the BOFI Decree of 1991 as amended.
(k)

Miscellaneous Provisions
To plug the remaining loopholes in the operation and regulation of
discount houses, miscellaneous provisions have been included. These provisions
touch on the role of the CBN with respect to the regulation and supervision
of discount houses; factors which could disqualify people from the management
of a discount house; and the consequences of failing to take reasonable steps
to ensure the accuracy of returns to the CBN. Finally, the miscellaneous
segment of the guidelines explains the treatment of capital invested in discount
houses in determining credit ceilings and prescribes penalties for breach of
the guidelines.
3.2

Review of the Operation of Discount Houses in Nigeria
After fulfilling the necessary requirements, three discount houses
commenced operations in Nigeria in 1993. Between 1995 and I 996, two more
discount houses joined the system. The commencement of the discount
houses came at a time the money market was relatively inefficient, regulated
and distorted. The prevailing inefficiency and distortion created an environment
which favoured the discount houses, at least, temporarily. For example, the
distress among the banks and the declining confidence in them enhanced
the patronage of the discount houses. Thus, banks with surplus funds
preferred investing them in the discount houses than in distressed banks.
For the same reasons, banks, which accumulated funds for the use in the
foreign exchange market, placed them temporarily with the discount houses
for some return before they were required for the purchase of foreign
exchange. Besides, the market was surfeit with excess liquidity. Thus,
the inefficiency in the money market provided initial benefits to the
discount houses.
Using the balance sheet as an indicator of growth, it could be seen
that the discount houses experienced initial boom from 1993 to 1994 and
fluctuating fortunes subsequently. Total assets/liabilities which stood at
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N4.5 billion in 1993 more than doubled to N9.6 billion in 1994 when the
number of the discount houses were still three. In spite of the increase in
the number of discount houses in 1995 by one to four, the total assets/
liabilities fell sharply to N3.4 billion at the end of the year. However, in 1996
total assets/liabilities rose substantially to Nl 1.8 billion. This coincided
with the growth in the number of discount houses by one to five during that
year. In 1997, the total assets of the five discount houses dropped sharply
to N7 .0 billion, thus repeating the I 995 experience. It was not surprising,
therefore, that the discount houses had been complaining of poor business.
A close look at the balance sheet of the discount houses shows that by 1997,
they had exhibited strong signs of illiquidity with declining cash balances
and reduced investments in government debt instruments. With the foregoing
insight into the operations of the discount houses, it would be appropriate
at this point to appraise the overall performance of the discount houses
with respect to their mandate and people's expectations.

3.3

Appraisal of the Overall Performance of the Discount Houses
This appraisal would concentrate on the extent the discount houses
have achieved the objectives for which they were set up and the constraining
influences in this regard. These are reviewed below:(a)
Achievements:
There is no doubt that discount houses embarked on some services
they were established to provide to the money market. Thus, they have:
(i) intermediated funds between the Central Bank and the banks;
(ii) served as dealers in the open market operations (OMO);
(iii) accepted short-term deposits from banks;
(iv) provided short-term accommodation to the banks; and
(v) traded in both treasury and commercial securities.
Through these services, the discount houses made reasonable profit,
especially between 1993 and 1994 and assisted in liquidity management,
thereby helping to promote growth and orderly development of the money
market.
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As already noted, the initial modest success of the discount houses
were accounted for by a number of factors. First, their operations were
protected and enhanced by a relatively inefficient, regulated and distorted
market which made it possible for them to make huge profit margins initially.
Second, the liquidity of the financial system was high and sometimes excessive,
thus providing the houses with the opportunity to benefit from its management.
Third, the placement with the discount houses attracted high interest yield
and therefore reasonable margins. Fourth, the pricing of treasury bills, the
main item of trade, was at some point considered adequate by the discount
houses. Finally, the unpredictable foreign exchange market encouraged the
banks to keep the funds for such transactions at call with discount houses
which benefitted financially from the banks' placements.

Constraining Influences
Since 1995, the discount houses started to find it difficult and less
profitable to provide some of the services they started with and to meet
other expectations. By 1997, the observed difficulties were reflected in
(a) declining balances with the banks; (b) declining balances with the Central
Bank and (c) declining claims on the Federal Government. Also declining
was the discount houses' lending to the banks through call money and
loans and advances. These developments adversely affected their total
assets which declined sharply in 1997 as shown earlier. The corresponding
fall in total liabilities was explained largely by declining borrowings, especially
through call money from banks and other financial institutions.
Another way in which discount houses have failed to live up to
expectation is in terms of their inability to underwrite treasury securities.
Although the guidelines have not made it mandatory for them to perform
this task, money market observers expected them to mature into performing
such a task as discount houses do in some other countries. The discount
houses, on their part, are prepared to perform this task but they hold the
view that their operational environment is not conducive for such a function.
For example, they argue that the issuance of securities must be market
determined if they are to take up the underwriting of such securities.

(b)
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Having reviewed the areas in which discount houses in Nigeria have
experienced problems, it would be necessary to identify the factors which
have influenced the turn of events. These factors, which are traced largely
to the reversal of their operational and regulatory environment, include
the accelerated deregulation of the money market, improved confidence in
the banking system, the pursuit of tight monetary policy, and enhanced
foreign exchange market as reviewed below:
Deregulation of the Money Market
Although deregulation of the money market started before the
establishment of the discount houses, it suffered many reverses in the distant
past. Since 1995, deregulation became more steady with profound effect on
the money market. The market became less distorted with stiff competition.
The resulting efficiency removed the protection hitherto conferred on
discount houses through regulation. This impinged on their profit margins.
(i)

(ii)

Improved Confidence in the Banking System
Following the success in the efforts to resolve the distress in the
banking sector, confidence returned to the system while the interbank market
started to boom once again. Consequently, the patronage which would have
gone to the discount houses switched over to healthy banks with surplus funds.
This has increased the number of banks which compete with the discount
houses in several ways, including dealing in treasury bill transactions.
Tight Monetary Policy
The tight monetary policy measures pursued in recent years
especially since 1995, has moderated liquidity significantly. As a result, the
size of excess liquidity has reduced considerably. Thus, the financial
benefits which discount houses derived from the management of the surfeit
of liquidity between 1993 and 1994 have declined.

(iii)

(iv)

Enhanced Foreign Exchange Market
The stability and improved efficiency of the foreign exchange market
smce 1995, coupled with the restoration of confidence in the banking system,
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has reduced the need for banks to keep large amount of funds on call with the
discount houses. This contrasts with the practice during the unpredictable
foreign exchange market era and the height of distress in banks when
substantial funds had to be kept by the banks with the discount houses
on call in order to meet their foreign exchange needs at short notice.
From the foregoing assessment, it is clear that the viability of the
discount houses is threatened. This has, no doubt, constrained the
effectiveness of the institutions and dampened the enthusiasm for their
establishment. In the next section, the measures to re-position the discount
houses for enhanced performance would be identified and appraised.

4.0

MEASURES TO ENHANCE THE CONTRIBUTION OF
DISCOUNT HOUSES TO MONEY MARKET DEVELOPMENT

4.1

Focus of Required Solution
To provide adequate solution to the problems of discount houses,
there is need to focus attention on those measures which enable them to
achieve the main objective for their establishment, namely, to make the
money market more effective. Consequently, the required solution should
be properly focussed. First, the solution should be comprehensive to avoid
measures which could create bottlenecks in other segments of the market,
thereby neutralizing the effects of the solutions provided. Second, the
expected solution should move away from a protected market and uphold
the current de-regulatory stance of the market, thus encouraging healthy
competition among money market operators. Finally, the required solution
should have a lasting favourable impact on the money market to prevent a
re-occurrence of the transient relief or boom they had between 1993 and 1994.
To uphold these principles, it would be useful to consider the recent experiences
of Nigeria and other countries in managing the money market.
4.2

Valuable Considerations in Seeking Solutions
From the experiences of Nigeria and other countries, it is clear that
the Nigerian money market can develop into an effective system with or
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without discount houses. However, it remains a fact that Nigeria has made
a deliberate choice of the discount houses to assist in making the market
effective. There is no doubt that the fortunes of the discount houses have
declined since 1995 because of changed operational and regulatory environment
which has reduced their viability. Consequently, there is need to ensure that
discount houses are viable without which they cannot perform their functions
effectively.
One of the suggestions for making discount houses viable is to keep
their traditional functions exclusively to them, for example, by serving as
principal dealers in the securities traded in the market. Although the creation
of a protected market for the discount houses can enhance their viability, it
should be noted that such a protection is inconsistent with the current
de-regulatory stance of the money market. Besides, Nigerian commercial and
merchant banks which were providing these services before the establishment
of discount houses still want to share these functions with discount houses.
Furthermore. the prevailing non-market contest for market shares does not
create harmony in the market, hence its elimination should be part of the
desired solution to the problems of the discount houses.
In view of the foregoing facts and valuable considerations it would
be necessary to provide solutions that would combine the following
clements as much as possible-.
(i) making discount houses viable;
(ii) bringing harmony among all money market operators;
(iii) encouraging emphasis on market orientation;
(iv) discouraging a protected market;
(v) deepening the money market; and
(vi) making money market activities supportive of monetary
management.

4.3

Providing a Lasting Solution to the Problems of Discount Houses

in Nigeria
Efforts to provide a lasting solution to the problems of discount
houses in Nigeria could be enhanced by learning from the recent experiences
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of Nigeria and other countries in money market management, as well as
focussing attention on the objectives and peculiarities of the Nigerian situation.
Three options come to mind. The first is to create a protected market for
discount houses while the second one is to allow open competition between
discount houses and banks. The third option is to permit discount houses,
banks and non-bank financial institutions to undertake discount house business.
However, since non-bank financial institutions in Nigeria, have neither
demonstrated serious interest in such business nor exhibited potentials for
such, the third option is not considered here. This leaves us with options
One and Two for consideration. These options are as follows:
Option One: Creating a Protected Market
for Discount Houses in Nigeria
This implies keeping discount house business exclusively for discount
houses. This would be in keeping with the traditional practice of discount
business in which the discount houses intermediate funds between the banks
and the Central Bank, thereby minimizing direct dealings of the banks with
the Central Bank in a number of activities. In Nigeria, the creation of a protected
market would imply taking measures to make the discount houses viable
by reserving their traditional functions for them. This would mean:
(i) making sure that banks do not engage in the traditional
functions of the houses, including acting as principal dealers
in government Securities; and
(ii) creating the enabling environment for the discount houses to
embark on the underwriting of government securities which is
not only the expectations of the founders of discount houses in
Nigeria but also the task performed by discount houses in many
other countries where they exist.
Creating a protected market for discount houses in Nigeria, however,
has a number of problems. First, a protected market at this point in time
would be inconsistent with the current de-regulatory stance of money
market management. Indeed the deregulation of the financial sector has come
to stay especially because of the enhanced efficiency in resource allocation
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stimulated by competition. Second, the so-called traditional functions of the
discount houses are also fundamental to the banks. In fact, the banks in
Nigeria were performing these functions before the discount houses were
established. Consequently, efforts to restrict these functions to the discount
house is likely to continue to create friction. While those banks which own
discount houses can be persuaded easily to keep away from discount house
business, other banks may be difficult to convince. Third, it is even difficult
to see how the five discount houses can survive on the traditional functions.
Since the discount houses depend largely on the margin they make in
securities trading, the existing volume of business can hardly support the
five discount houses already in existence. Besides, as the financial sector
becomes more efficient and less distorted with other operators performing
their functions more effectively, the margin which discount houses make
from liquidity management would become less and less. Thus, the observed
threat to the viability of the discount houses on its traditional functions appears
to be real. This realization creates the need for considering the second
option for bringing relief to discount houses which are experiencing
declining fortunes currently.
Option Two: Allowing Competition Between
Discount Houses and Banks
Another way of making discount houses viable, so as to enhance
their capacity to perform their functions effectively, is to allow them to
compete with banks in performing not only the traditional functions of the
discount houses but also selected banking functions. There are several
reasons for this alternative solution. First, it is a realistic way of making
the discount houses viable without which the discount houses cannot
perform their traditional functions at both the primary and secondary levels.
There is already enough evidence to show that they can hardly survive on
their traditional functions unless they are given some protection which, in
itself, has its problems. Second, since the banks seek to perform discount
house functions and discount houses, in turn, contest for banking functions,
an appropriate compromise is to allow them to undertake both functions
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especially under the current deregulated environment. Third, the persistence
with which discount houses and banks want to perform each other's functions
underline the fact that discount house system in Nigeria is an artificial creation,
hence the need to throw their respective functions open to each other.
Indeed, in many countries (including the Philippines and the United States
of America), as noted earlier, there are no discount houses. Consequently,
a selected group of banks and related institutions carry out discount house
business without assuming the nomenclature of discount houses. Since the
discount houses in Nigeria have viability problems because of restricted
market there is need to increase the scope of their operation.
Finally, the experience of some countries operating the discount
houses system provides some useful lessons in the restructuring of the discount
houses in Nigeria. A review of the growth of discount houses in such countries
show that over the years, economic and financial reforms have transformed
the discount houses from either short-term securities dealers to long-term
securities traders or to investment bankers and related functions. Like Nigeria,
these other countries find a protected discount business inconsistent with
the de-regulatory reforms which have swept the world economy, especially
since the turn of the 1980s. This explains why Britain has de-emphasized
the use of discount houses, thereby allowing the existing ones to diversity
into all sorts of financial business.
Although discount houses in Zimbabwe are still largely in pure
discount houses business, their continued survival is attributed mainly to
the confidence the ba11ks have in them and the deliberate effort by the
regulatory authorise to keep their number low so as to ensure business for
them in the relatively limited discount house market. In Nigeria, the
confidence which banks had in discount houses in 1993 and 1994, at the
height of banking system distress, started to decline since 1995 as
confidence returned to the banks and discount houses started to be less liquid.
In Malaysia, discount houses which were introduced as "keepers of liquidity"
in the money market were, by 1989 - 1991, brought under the Banking Act
and were permitted to expand the scope of their operations as may be
approved from time to time by the Malaysian Central Bank.
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The Preferred Option
From the foregoing analysis, the second option of allowing discount
houses to be involved in some areas traditionally reserved for banks is
preferred. Although, some of the reasons for the preference are already
indicated. The most important is the operating environment which has tendecl
to put the houses at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the banks. In fact this has been
adduced as the principal reason for the poor performance by the houses.
Furthermore, the predominant global practice has been increasing liberalization
in the functions of discount houses relative to banking operations. Indeed 1
only a relatively small number of countries have experimented money market
management with the services of discount houses while the larger number
of countries use a combination of institutions for this purpose including discount
houses. The observed widening of the scope of discount houses beyond
the traditional discount house business in the countries where they exist,
appear to confirm the fact that the market for pure discount house business
is limited. the strategy whereby discount houses are offered greater flexibility
in operation is recommended in order to re-position the discount houses in
Nigeria for improved performance. The essence. is to allow the houses to be
involved in areas outside the discount business which was traditionally
reserved for banks. This could be in areas of investment banking and other
fee based activities that could enhance their operational performance.
5.0
5.1

SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
Summary
The five-part paper attempts to review, appraise and find solutions
to the current problems of discount house business in Nigeria. To this end,
Section One identified the focus of the paper which is to find solution to
the declining fortunes of discount house business in Nigeria. To appreciate
the characteristics of discount houses, Section Two explored the meaning
and rationale for discount houses and underlined their international
perspectives by examining their operations and progress in several countries.
Section Three of the paper reviewed and appraised the establishment,
operations and performance of discount houses in Nigeria. In particular,
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their achievements and constraining influences were noted. This Section
observed that while the discount houses performed some of their functions
fairly well between 1993 and 1994, they started from 1995 to experience
problems which affected their viability adversely. In fact, these problems,
which translate into insufficient business, affected their margins, hence they
started to look beyond discount house business for survival. In Section
Four, the paper sought solutions to the problems of insufficient business
within the traditional discount houses. It was observed that the solution to
the current problems of discount houses is either to promote a protected
discount house business for discount houses or to allow discount houses
and banks to compete for discount house and banking businesses.

5.2

Concluding Remarks
The paper concluded its findings by preferring a joint action option
in which the existing discount houses are allowed to expand the scope of
their operations by including banking functions. This ensures that they are
viable without which they cannot perform their primary responsibility in
the money market. In the same way, the banks which have been itching to
perform discount house business and which meet a minimum performance
criteria, should be allowed to do so.
The benefits of this partnership are many. First, harmony could be
brought to the money market as the banks and the discount houses would be
engaged in those functions they have struggled over the years to perform.
Second, the arrangement could be equitable in the sense that those banks
which do not own discount houses would be allowed to undertake discount
house business. Third, the restructuring or re-positioning of discount
houses would be an appropriate solution to their viability problems in view
of the limited market for pure discount house business, especially when
the money market becomes more efficient and less distorted. Fourth, the
proposed arrangement is in line with the de-regulatory reforms in the
money market which relies heavily on market forces with emphasis on
competition in the provision of financial services. The envisaged solution
is also consistent with the predominant global practice in which a selected
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group of financial institutions are utilized to carry out discount house
business in addition to performing other money market functions assigned
to them. Finally, the joint option would provide a consortium of discount
houses and banks whose financial "muscle" would be adequate for the task
of underwriting government securities.
While endorsing joint action by discount houses and banks in
providing discount house and banking services, efforts should be made to
provide adequate direction for the proposed restructuring. Although details
of such restructuring is not the focus of this paper, it would suffice here to
suggest that institutions which would be affected by the envisaged
re-posi_tioning should meet a minimum performance criteria to be determined
by the regulatory authorities.
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DISCOUNT HOUSES' STATEMENT OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
(N=' million)
ITEMS

1993

1994

I I\

/?\

1996

1995
11\

(,1\

1997
('i\

ASSETS

CASH & BALANCE WITH BANKS
i) Cash on hand
ii) Balances with CBN
iii) Balances with other banks

CLAIMS ON FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)

Treasury Bills
Treasury Certificate Maturing
Treasury Bonds
Eligible Development Stock

CLAIMS ON STATE GOVERNMENTS
CLAIMS ON BANKS
i)
Money at Call
ii) Loans and Advances
iii) Commercial Bills
a) Bankers Acceptances
b) Promissory Notes
c) Negotiable Certificate of Deposit
d) Stabilisation Securities
iv) Others

CLAIMS ON OTHER FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS

a)
b)

Money at Call
Loans and advances
Commercial Bills:
Promissory Notes
Negotiable Certificate of Deposit

CLAIMS ON OTHERS
i) Commercial Bills
ii) Loans and Advances
iii) Others

6.4
0.1
0.0
6.3

50.5
0.2
15.4
34.9

71.3
0.2
(2.3)
73 .4

203.3
0.3
0.0
203.0

99.5
0.4
0.0
99. 1

4,213.2
4.029.6
0.0
0.0
183.6

7,125.9
7.125.9
0.0
0.0
0.0

2.468.4
1,552.6
0.0
0.0
915.8

6.479.9
6.479.7
0.0
0.0
0.2

1,506.4
1.499.2
0.0
0.0
7.2

138.7
0.0
0.0
138.7
138.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

2.308. 1
232.0
0.0
2,076.1
2.076. 1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

662.2
252.0
0.0
410.2
4 10.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

2.522.2
179.6
1,583.8
693.8
555.4
0.0
0.0
138.4
65.0

3.082.0
115.0
78.0
2,789.0
2,789.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

338.7
338.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

1,890.7
1,865.7
25.0
0.0
0.0

1,777.6
1,580.0
0.0
197.6
0.0

0.0

0.1
0.0
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DISCOUNT HOUSES' STATEMENT OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES

(N=' million) (Contd.)
ITEMS

1993
(I)

1994
(2)

1995
(3)

1996
(4)

1997
(5)

ASSETS

103.5

98.4

169.0

207.9

335.7

FIXED ASSETS

0.0

0.3

610

135.7

174.9

TOTAL ASSETS

4,461 .8

9,583.2

3,431.9

11,778.4

6,976.1

436.0
385.0
0.5
0.0
50.5
0.0

565.7
437.5
18.5
0.0
109.7
0.0

865.6
667.5
51.0
0.0
147.0
0.0

1,251.7
948.5
127.8
37.9
51.6
85.9

1,430.5
950.4
141.2
I 13.7
155.4
69.8

MONEY-AT-CALL
i) Commercial Banks
ii) Merchant Banks
iii) Non-Bank Financial Institutions
iv) Others

3,350.0
3,350.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

5,517.6
5,517.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

707.9
707.9
0.0
0.0
0.0

7,653.1
6,125.8
313.2
1,214.0
0.1

1,617.3
701.1
5.7
907.4
3.1

OTHER AMOUNT OWING. TO:
·i) Commercial Banks
ii) Merchant Banks
iii) Non-Bank Financial Institutions
iv) Others

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

251.1
0.0
0.0
I.I
250.0

2.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.6

BORROWINGS
i) Central Bank of Nigeria
ii) Overdrafts
iii) Other Banks

2.9
2.6
0.0
0.3

2,347.5
0.0
0.0
2,347.5

610.0
0.0
0.0
610.0

13.4
0.0
13.4
0.0

2,219.9
2,016.3
3.6
200.0

672.9

1,152.4

1,248.5

2,609.1

1.705.8

4,461.8

9,583.2

3,431 .9

11,778.4

6,976. 1

OTHER ASSETS

LIABILITIES
CAPITAL AND RESERVES
i) Paid-up Capital
ii) Statutory Reserves
iii} Share Premium
iv) Other Reserves
v) General Reserve

OTHER LIABILITIES
TOTAL LIABILITIES
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